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1. Introduction 
This chapter presents an abstract system framework called ‘’System for Investigation of 
Railway Interfaces’’ (SIRI), to study potential or past railway accident(s). The aim of the 
study is to learn about the multiple causal factors (elements or conditions) which 
represented together can be called a cause leading to the undesired state called potential or 
accident situation. Safety studies like SIRI can be used in conjunction with the quantitative 
risk estimation method (PRA) to help highlight or uncover decisions leading to assumption 
of unreasonable risk or human error in engineering and management factors needs to be 
studied. Author accepts the viewpoint of George E.Apostolakis on the utility of quantitative 
risk analysis (QRA) or probability risk analysis ( PRA) techniques in general (E.Apostolakis 
2004). The questions of human error and organisational learning are clarified later in the 
chapter in the context of acceptance of QRA method.  
The SIRI Framework uses synthetic mode of thinking as opposed to analytical mode of 
thinking. Analytical mode of thinking is like decomposing water which does no longer 
contains anything liquid and has taste. The SIRI Framework synthesises multiple study 
methods into a cohesive process represented as a system. The study methods used in stages 
to arrive at the decision of a potential accident situation in an unambiguous manner are 
Hazard identification method (HAZOP), Event Causal Factor Analysis (ECFA), Energy 
Barrier Trace Analysis (EBTA), accident investigation technique (MORT), and cognitive 
human factors framework (SRK) and systems thinking integrated into a cohesive system 
framework. This is to facilitate the conceptual work of defining an operational system and 
inquiry into causal factors (individual, technical and organisational factors) to get an 
unambiguous feedback on the potential or actual accident situation. In this way, it is hoped 
that decisions, which might take operational situation outside the safe envelope due to 
groupthink bias or individual decision maker bias, may be detected at the planning stage or 
pre-design stage itself. Readers can gain access to the MORT user manual and related 
information from the NRI Foundation (Noordwijk Risk Foundation 1998). Need for 
analytical framework or   multiple study methods are noted in the safety literature, but 
author wishes to cite two articles in support (Hovdon, Storseth and Tinmmanvisk 2011), 
(Hale, P.H.Lin and Roelen 2011).  
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This paper verified two theses accepted within the SIRI Framework. First, fallible decision 
making is the starting point of the accident sequence and is connected with the failure of 
foresight and/or not heeding warning signals, or where hindsight bias or groupthink bias 
dominates or lessons learnt are not applied or no lessons are learnt or not performing 
system safety analysis (B. A. Turner 1976), (J. Reason 1990), (Johnson.W.G 1974), (Wei 2008), 
(Kletz 2002). Second, it is possible to gain insight into the hazardous conditions or events 
that pre-disposes a normal act into an unsafe act in conjunction with local less than adequate 
defences in a complex system (Johnson.W.G 1974),  (Briscose .G 1990), (IEC 2001), (Kingston, 
et al. 2004). Knowledge of past outcomes is not necessarily a good guide to future outcomes 
was established by Fischoff (1975) and this phenomenon was named as hindsight bias. The 
effect of hindsight bias and its two forms is cited by James Reason in his study of human error 
(J. Reason 1990). The concept of impossible accident, promoted by Wagenaar and Groeneweg 
(1988), is used to convey the idea that accidents appear to be the result of highly complex 
coincidences which could rarely be foreseen by the people involved (J. Reason 1990). The 
SIRI analyses of the Herefordshire Accident show that notion of impossible accident is not true 
in the case of level crossing accidents. Why? Because people involved in the decision making 
situation are prone to group think bias and prone to blame others in the projects and/or 
different organisations and rarely look at own actions which lead to bad policy or decision 
making (Goodwin 2006), (Whittingham 2004), (Weyman 2006), (S. Appicharla 2010), (S. 
Appicharla 2011). Re-evaluation of data and hypothesis is necessary to avoid confirmation 
bias. This can be seen in the case of scientists who assumed that the thesis nothing can travel 
faster than light. This thesis was falsified in the OPERA experiment. The summary of this 
OPERA experiment can be found in the science and technology section of the Economist 
(The Economist 2011). The two ideas learnt from Albert Einstein are: a) that time sequence of 
events experienced cannot be equated with the order of experience in time in the context of 
acoustical and visual experience; and b) physicists endeavour to eliminate psychical element 
from the causal nexus of existence (Einstein 1920). Contrary to the physicist(s) approach in 
the Einstein tradition, it is necessary to include psychical element and conduct the 
evaluation of technical as well as organisational aspects individually and re-evaluate them 
together in the safety studies (both accident investigation and project safety studies). 
However, no such re-evaluation was seen on the part of UK railway signalling industry in 
the case of the Herefordshire accident cited in this chapter. Author presented the 
Herefordshire railway accident case study based upon the principles of line side signalling 
perspective to verify the thesis accidents are due to ‘’satisficing behaviour’’ displayed by the 
railway organisations. No case study is presented from a cab signalling perspective as an 
incident on a level crossing installed on the ERTMS signalled railway is under RAIB 
investigation. Details are given in the chapter later on.  
The main thrust of this chapter is on the topic of taking a ‘system approach to railway 
Safety’ and is designed to: 
a. help railway signalling engineers and managers utilise the framework as an 
independent  system safety analysis methodology to help identify potential accident 
scenarios ( system hazard) , detect and analyse the hazard causal factors and enable 
take preventive actions;  
b. help post-accident/incident investigators utilise the framework to facilitate learning of 
lessons and help draw correct conclusions from a single event (incident or accident) 
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which occurred in the recent or remote past to identify and verify the thesis that 
conjunction of management and engineering oversights and/or omissions or the undue 
acceptance of risk were the causal factors behind the occurrence of the incident or 
accident.   
The conceptual basis of the chapter is based on author’s three published papers in the IET 
International System Safety Conferences  and unpublished consultation commentary 
provided to the UK statutory body, the UK Law Commission in October 2010 (S. Appicharla 
2006), (S. Appicharla 2010) (S. K. Appicharla 2010), (S. Appicharla 2011).  Author’s work 
experience, and learning from the past RSSB Research projects and study of related 
literature from domain of systems engineering, decision making, risk management, accident 
analysis and investigation, psychology, mathematics and philosophy have also provided 
necessary inputs. The concepts associated with the ‘system approach to safety’ which author 
wished to promote in conjunction with interested members of public are publicly available 
on the Wikipedia website (Wikipedia 2011). Demand for system approach is described in the 
safety literature as well (Elliot 1999). 
This chapter highlights the application of the third step of the SIRI Framework. The aim is to 
support efforts to identify system hazard(s), and select amongst alternative solution(s) to 
deal with the identified hazard(s). Earlier application stages of the SIRI Framework were 
elaborated in the IET International System Safety Conference publications in 2006 and 2010 
(S. Appicharla 2006), (S. Appicharla 2010)  
The process of dealing with the hazards that arise with the implementation of the selected 
option can be dealt with by applying the same procedure or the procedure developed by 
Stephen Derby and Ralph Keeney (L.Derby and Keeny 1981). Stephen Derby and Ralph 
Keeney argued that the question of ‘how safe is safe enough’ cannot be answered using the 
subjective utility criteria ( experts judgement) or using risk quantified in  10-7/person/year risk 
or by performing value trade-off analysis as they do not satisfy the needs of collective decision 
making. They reckon that collective decision making is a problem riddled with ethical 
constraints. Any analysis of decisions on acceptable risk must ponder on social, technical, 
political and ethical dimensions. A similar observation has been made by the Royal Academy 
of Engineering on the matter of engineering ethics in practice. They have issued a long and 
short version of documents discussing the complications involved and the short version was 
accessed by author (The Royal Academy of Engineering 2011). Author has noted that there is a 
growing interest in the subject matter of philosophy in engineering domain.  
The rest of the chapter is organised in this way. Section 2 defines the concepts used in the 
SIRI Framework. Section 3 presents a case study using the SIRI Framework to help 
understand its application. Section 4 states the problem statement which the solution has 
addressed.  Section 5 summarises and draws conclusions on subject matter of the chapter. 
Section 6 acknowledges the help received from others. Section 7 provides the references.   
2. Definitions of concepts in the SIRI framework  
2.1 Cognitive systems engineering, affordance of harm and reality  
The notions of ‘’system’’ and ‘systems engineering’ are used in the way as they are defined 
by Benjamin Blanchard (Benjamin.S.Blanchard 2004). Systems engineering is taken to mean 
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the orderly process of bringing a system into being. A ‘’system’’ comprises a complex of 
combinations of resources (in the form of human beings, materials, equipment, software, 
facilities, data, information, services, etc.) integrated in such a manner as to fulfill a 
designated need.  
A system is developed to accomplish a specific function, or series of functions, and may be 
classified as a natural system, human- made system, physical system, conceptual system, 
closed-loop system, open-loop system, static system, dynamic system, and so on. Readers 
can refer to the work of Benjamin S. Blanchard and Wolter J. Fabrcky to learn the 
distinctions between analytical and synthetic mode of thought (J.Fabrcky and S.Blanchard 
2005). For want of physical space, author cannot reflect upon the two modes of thinking in 
this chapter.  
Author got familiar with the application of system approach in the social science field from 
reading the works of an economist, F.A. Hayek apart from its application in the 
thermodynamic field1 and has argued an application in an unpublished paper in 1998 (S. 
Appicharla 1998). Subsequent to this, author has learnt that Herbert A.Simon’s concepts of 
‘’bounded rationality’’ and ‘’satisficing behavior’’ have influenced the works of Irving L. 
Janis, Barry Turner, Charles Perrow and James Reason as well (L.Janis and Mann 1977), (B. 
A. Turner 1976), (Perrow 1984), (J. Reason 1990). Herbert A. Simon’s work was influenced 
by F.A. Hayek’s concepts is gathered from the quote by Herbert Simon that no one has 
characterized market economy better than F.A.Hayek. Gary Baker, an empirical economist, 
acknowledges the influence of F.A Hayek in his work on Human Capital but notes that 
centrally planned and other such economies that do not make effective use of markets and 
prices raise co-ordination costs thereby reduce incentives for investments in specialized 
knowledge. Baker states that F.A. Hayek stated that… the problem of a rational economic 
order is….the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in totality (Baker 1964). 
The division of labour is greater, in economies that make effective use of prices and markets 
to co-ordinate tasks and skills across firms. However, the case study presented in this 
chapter found that market economy destroys divine capital (it is assumed in this chapter 
that life is the work of divine capital) and no necessary investment into human capital is 
needed to prevent this destruction from occurring. In other words, as Charles Perrow 
argued the cost of transactions are borne by the wider society (Perrow 1984).  
The concept of cognitive systems engineering is introduced by members of human factors 
engineering community, as an approach to describe and analyse man-machine systems. 
Daniel Woods, ERIK Hollnagel (1983) described the concept in a paper titled, ‘’cognitive 
systems engineering; new wine in new bottles’’ (Hollnagel and David.D 1983). In that paper, 
they quoted Criak (1943) who remarked: ‘’If  the  organism carries a "small-scale  model"  of 
external reality and  of  its  possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various 
alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react to future situations before they arise, 
utilize the knowledge of past events in dealing with the  present and the future,  and in 
every way to  react in a much fuller, safer, and more competent manner to the emergencies 
which face it’’.  An extension of this idea that a machine must possess a logical model of its 
                                                 
1Examples of system approaches such as heat flow balance modelled as differential equations can be 
gathered from standard text books on control systems engineering or from text books on Bayesian 
mathematical functions. 
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environment in multiple levels was discussed in the paper by Erik Hollnagel and David.D. 
Woods.  
Prior to this, Barry A. Turner relying upon a similar concept of collective adoption of 
simplified assumptions into a framework of ‘bounded rationality’ helped deduced the fact 
that large scale intelligence failures are seen to occur in the organisational and inter-
organisational practices prior to the occurrence of disaster. Drawing upon three case studies 
of public inquiries in United Kingdom, Turner hypothesized that a set of cultural beliefs 
about the world and its hazards in the social context and associated pre-cautionary norms 
set out in the laws, codes of practice, mores and folkways are the starting point of events in a 
process made up of 6 stages ending up with cultural re-adjustment. One of the public 
inquiry studied was the Hixon accident which is relevant in the railway context (B. A. 
Turner 1976). Earlier to this period, the concepts of organism, adaptive behavior and 
regulation in an environment were studied by Ashby (W. Ashby 1960), (W. Ashby 1960), 
(Ashby and Conant 1970). The concepts of representation of external reality as an object and 
the four roots of the principle of sufficient reason were discussed by Arthur Schopenhauer 
(Schopenhaeur 1820/2006). These set of ideas were followed by Leo Tolstoy (Tolstoy 
1887/1930), and Alfred North Whitehead (Whitehead 1927/1978).  Alfred North Whitehead 
traced the origin of these concepts back to the Buddhists whereas Arthur Schopenhauer 
traced the origin of these concepts back to the Upanishads. The principle Upanishads were 
translated from Sanskrit to English by Valerie Roebuck (Valerie 2003). Valerie Roebuck in 
the contemporary period traces the origin to pre-buddhistic Upanishad era in the fifth or 
sixth centuries BCE (Valerie 2003). Author has learnt from Jens Rasmussen and others that 
the concept of system coming into being can be traced back to ancient Greek times 
represented by Aristotelian notion of causation ( (Rasmussen, Pejtersen and Goodstein 
1994). The concepts of self or soul and external reality are mentioned by Aristotle in the 
ancient Greek times in the book VII on Politics (Aristotle 323 BC/1951).   
The concepts of the Platonic world of mathematical forms such as squares, cubes, circles, 
spheres etc were recognized to be distinct from the corresponding approximate entities 
(substantial forms) in contemporary Greek physical world,and giving considerations to 
them in abstract form may give rise to a doubt whether the Platonic world of mathematical 
forms is ‘real’ (Penrose 2004) (Plato 375 BC/1995).  However, these doubts can be dispelled 
when the fact that RSA algorithm relies on mathematics to support electronic 
communication between sender and a recipient in the public domain in modern 
communications is recognized (Singh 2001). The idea of relativity of time can be gathered 
from the BBC news headline that engineers can learn from the way slime mould searches for 
food resembled the 100 year old Tokyo rail network and the way it solved the problem of 
finding an efficient way through the maze (The BBC 2010). Mathematics cannot determine 
absolute motion since everything determined by it ends in relations by stating perfect 
equivalence between theories as in astronomy is a fact noted by G.W. Leibniz in his New 
System of the Nature (G.W 1695/1998). 
According to Benjamin S. Blanchard and Wolter J. Fabrcky(2006), social groups organizing 
themselves possessing inherent abilities and the knowledge to maintain its stock of technology 
can be said to have civilization. They assert that modern civilizations possess pervasive and 
potent technical systems that provide products, systems, structures and services. In this sense, 
author asserts that both ancient and modern civilizations possessed potent technical systems 
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that can afford harm and benefits in the way they followed the norms. As an example, in the 
ancient Vedic civilizations, people carried out the sacrificial ceremonies which belong to the 
ritualistic portion of the Vedas to the letter without comprehending the spirit of sacrifice. This 
is learnt from reading the verses 3.10 to 3.13 of the Bhagavad Gita as translated and 
commented by Swami Nikhilananda (Nikhilananda 1944). It is accepted in this paper the truth 
which is stated in the Upanishad that there are three kinds of adversity: fever, headaches etc 
arising from disorder of the body( internal) , arising (from) external objects, such as tigers, 
snakes; arising from the action of great cosmic forces, such as those cause rain, storms, or 
earthquakes.  Similarly, prosperity is of three kinds (Nikhilananda 1944).  For explanatory 
purposes, it is assumed that the actions cause results (the desired or undesired) observed 
which arise from the combination of three causes acting together: material cause, efficient 
cause and formal cause to give rise to the final cause (the desired or undesired) effect. This is 
Aristotle theory of causation (Aristotle, Ethics 350BC/1955).  The Aristotle theory of causation 
bears a very close resemblance to the deductive science of Gunas (three modes of material 
modifications) articulated in the fourteenth chapter of the Bhagavad Gita and reading of the 
verse 3.27 which states that all work is performed by Gunas of Prakriti and the idea that Self is 
an agent is false knowledge (Nikhilananda 1944).  Scientists and philosophers citing or 
drawing inspiration from the Sacred Scriptures is not an uncommon phenomenon. Sir Issac 
Newton held the view that both Nature and Scripture were presentations of God’s message to 
man, which was to be learned scientifically or through the study of God’s revelation as 
presented in the Bible and/or Koran. Newton in his Principia Mathematica, offered a version 
of the argument of design to show that we (critical reader may disagree) could know of God 
scientifically (Popkin H. R 1969). 
Some examples relevant to the misery faced by the railway customers can be comprehended 
from the real world examples. Reading the news items about signalling cable thefts or the 
rats eating away the signalling cables, lightning causing signalling circuits to fail highlight 
nature of problems faced (Wainwright, 21 September 2011),  (The BBC News, 27 September 
2011), (The BBC News, 12 August 2011). To prevent erroneous conclusions that can be 
drawn based on the foregoing that wireless or radio communication based signalling 
systems provide better safety and security, a process with a pattern similar to the SIMILAR 
process is needed. The customer or beneficiary can be assumed to be members of local or 
wider society.  Author had conceived the SIRI Framework in response to a request from the 
signalling engineer’s request to help identify the duty-holder interfaces. The problem 
statement author started working from is given in the section 4. 
2.2 Systems thinking process 
A.Terry Bahill and Bruce Gissing asserted that humans (as individuals, on teams, and in 
organisations) employ simple processes to increase their probability of success. They argued 
that Peter Senge’s Fifth Discipline, Shewart’s Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle, Covey’s 7 habits of 
highly effective people, Katzeban and Smith’s The Wisdom of Teams, INCOSE Fellow 
Consensus on Systems Engineering Process and IEEE 1220 Systems Engineering Process 
shares the common roots of the SIMILAR process. These processes were mapped to the 
SIMILAR process to show them sharing common roots in systems thinking in the IEEE 
article (Gissing and Bahill 1998). Thus, the SIMILAR process would serve as a comparative 
benchmark for the SIRI Framework.   
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The SIMILAR process is stated in a very brief manner. A picture of the SIMILAR process is 
shown in Figure 1. It is concerned with logically consistent and effective means of planning 
and problem solving. The process starts with the stage of developing a system in an 
engineering environment to address the current deficiency and description of what function 
must be done or satisfied by the system. At this stage what is determined. This is State the 
Problem stage. With completion of the problem definition stage, the process moves to the 
Investigate Alternatives where the functional alternatives are searched to satisfy the 
problem statement. After the match has been made between the need and the solution to 
satisfy the need, a model is developed and is analysed to determine what is to be. At the 
Integrate Stage, the developed model or simulations etc are checked for the compatibility 
with the sub –systems to assure that interfaces exist between sub-systems for transferring 
the outputs/data/information as the case may be.  
Inherent feedback loops between inter-connected sub-systems must be checked to minimize 
the exchange. Architects of the SIMILAR process assert that well-designed systems integrate 
sub-systems such that they contribute to whole direction of the system. Launch the System 
means running the system and producing the outputs. Assess Performance is the stage 
where the metrics are used to measure the performance. Terry Bahill and Bruce Gissing did 
not mention the qualitative aspects at this stage, but author reckons that both quantitative 
and qualitative aspects must be taken into account. The Re-evaluate is the feedback stage at 
each of the process stage to assess and evaluate the performance. Terry Bahill and Bruce 
Gissing reckon that repeated application of the process to systems, sub-systems, 
components in an iterative manner produces outputs similar to a fractal process. Further, 
the Re-evaluate Stage runs parallel to the main work streams of the SIMILAR process. 
Author wishes to clarify that the representation of the SIMILAR process does not represent 
causality. It should be noted the notion of causality applies to physical systems rather than 
social systems.  
 
Fig. 1. A graphical representation of the SIMILAR process.  
The perception and definition of a particular system, its architecture and its constituent 
elements depend on an observer’s interests and responsibilities. One person’s system - of - 
interest can be viewed as a system element or product in other person’s system - of- interest. 
Conversely, it can be viewed as being part of the environment of operation for another person’s 
system of interest. The basic definition of a system at the modelling stage can give rise to 
disputes. Mathematically inclined people would not agree to a definition of a system given in 
the new formed (during 1970s) soft systems engineering tradition (I.Mitrani 1982). The notion of 
a system and its definition can give rise to multiple interpretations can be evidenced from a 
recent publication in the UK railway domain as well (G.J.Bearfield; R.Short September 2011). 
However, author notes and agrees with I.Mitrani observation that motivation for modelling 
objective (from any kind of modelling activity) is that process of observing and learning from 
the real system in operation is too difficult, too hazardous or too expensive. This is the case 
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when a system is not yet built. Alternatively, the objective may be to assess the performance of 
the effect of a proposed major changes in an existing system ( for example, addition of 
European train control systems, moving block systems, renewal of fixed block signalling etc). 
The SIMILAR process does provide a basis on which such problems can be sorted out by 
describing a new process bench marked to a tested and agreed systems thinking process 
model. This is line with the thoughts of the architects of the SIMILAR process. Given that 
human behavior is fragile and fallible in nature, it is necessary that a systematic method that 
can transcend or overcome the errors in faculties of perception, cognition and judgments 
based upon limited, narrow professional expertise is necessary.   
The SIMILAR process appears to cater to that need. However, in the case of safety problems, 
no stakeholder is in a position to outline the problem in a manner as it is expected by the 
SIMILAR process. Further, it is a matter of every day experience that man –made and 
natural system (s) do produce unwanted outcomes in the form of incidents or accidents. 
However, the SIMILAR process calls for multiple methods to be used is evidenced from the 
graphical representation of the process in the Fig. 1.  
Many accident investigators or researchers have used models or methods to explain ‘what’ 
happened afterwards. However, system developers, owners and operators and maintainers are 
more interested in learning lessons and taking  preventive actions in a cost effective manner. 
This paper presents a proactive approach by revealing the gaps in the knowledge of parameters 
that sit on the boundaries of the systems, sub-systems and components. These give rise to 
notion of a ‘system hazard’ which given the rights conditions can escalate to an accident.  
From an energy perspective, harm arises from inherent danger in the sources of energy 
which have not been diverted into safe channels in the performance of work and its unsafe 
flow of energy is triggered by a change in the circumstances due to lack of awareness 
and/or risk taking behavior on the part of social elements of the system. Energy is a 
necessary ingredient for attainment of success of any system of work. This perspective 
focusses attention on the organisational factors, workplace factors and the individual factors 
and the state of barriers in the analysis of the sequential progress of accident sequence. The 
decisions taken at the work group level (or organisational level) provide for latent failure 
pathway if the hazard is not recognized at the planning of the work or in the standards that 
regulate the work processes. The Swiss Cheese Model SCM is used to trigger the analyst’s 
awareness to check for organisational factors in the M Branch of the MORT analysis.  
James Reason (2007) in his 18th Westminster Lecture on ‘recurrent patterns in transport 
accidents’ stated that there are three levels of accident contributors: universals (the ever 
present tension between protection and production), conditions and causes (the local factors 
that combine with certain conditions to breach defences in unforeseen and unforeseeable 
ways) (Reason J. , 2007).  Reason’s lecture was intended to pose more questions than provide 
answers. He noted that answers to the ‘why’ question are often found well ‘upstream’ in 
both time and space from the event: indicting the organisation, the regulator and sometimes 
the entire transport system. Author could not determine why this method of explanation 
should not be pursued from Reasons’ perspective. Author’s speculation in this area is that 
James Reason does not think re-engineering of a social technical system is a legitimate and 
feasible activity. Author notes that social technical system is a small part of wider 
geographical society which is greater than a local social technical system.  
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Author thinks that James Reason’s research is countered by 17th Westminster Lecture given 
by Phil Goodwin on ‘determination’ and ‘denial: the paradox of safety research and traffic 
policy (Goodwin, 2006). He gave three arguments for not taking action aimed at improving 
safety in the case of road transport. First, the trends will take care of the problems. This is 
the idea that the technical advance will solve all problems. Second, road driver behavior is 
unsafe and cannot be influenced. This is an example of ‘law of unintended consequences’. 
And third, reducing collisions in one place is not due to anything due to human 
intervention, but a random effect counteracted by increases somewhere else. In the extreme 
form, this is an example of the view that universe operates randomly, and human agency is 
ineffective. He concluded his lecture by saying that his research led to the recurrent 
conclusion that the effects of policy on behaviour are bigger than has been conventionally 
assumed –behaviour does change, and substantially. This has been obscured from general 
awareness by biases in the form of data and models which have been influential, which has 
led to a continual underestimate of the potential both for making things better by good 
policies and making them worse by misguided policies (Goodwin 2006). The role of various 
biases in the failure of Incident Reporting Systems in UK has been studied by Chris Johnson 
(C. Johnson 2002). Author wishes to argue that the ‘SIRI Framework’ and ‘STAMP’ accident 
models fall under this category of models for safety improvement from cosmological 
perspective( analysis of cause-effect relations) (S. Appicharla 2011) (N. Leveson 2011).   
Author notes that accident modelling from ontological perceptive (analysis of what is –
ought to be relations) is studied by Why Because Analysis method which is advanced by 
Peter Ladkin based upon David Hume’s philosophy (Ladkin 1995). 
 
Fig. 2. A reference Model for Accident Analysis. Sourced from (Wkipedia 2011). 
With basic notion(s) outlined above, the mapping of the SIMILAR process onto the SIRI 
Framework is provided in the Table 1. This is to argue the case that without sacrificing the core 
notions of the SIMILAR Process, it is possible to establish identity between two systems 
thinking processes.  Author has learnt that the notion of systems thinking was part of the 
deliberations when Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) was being developed by 
William Johnson and his team. Both concepts of system as composite entity made up of entities 
and as a systematic method for investigation as well were noted in the original MORT 
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documentation (Johnson.W.G, 1974). Prior to this notion of system made up of barriers, 
threats, regulator and essential variables was articulated by Ashby (Ashby W., 1956/1999), 
(Ashby W., 1960) (Ashby and Conant 1970).  The SIRI Framework does re-use several of these 
concepts developed by Ashby and MORT team. Ashby used the example of adaptive behavior 
on part of a train driver in his treatise on Design for a Brain (W. Ashby 1960). 
Claiming completeness of knowledge is a herculean task; however, using the principles of 
abstraction, refinement and information presentation in a careful manner, UK railway 
industry can make a claim that railways are safe to operate even under changing conditions. 
This is achieved by detecting all safety critical deviations possible in the system at the 
operational time and ensuring that safeguards are available to prevent those variations 
escalating into accidents. Author rejects the idea of safety case approach based upon formal 
approaches such Bayesian belief networks  or compliance with railway CENELEC norms is 
sufficient unless the safety and electro-magnetic compatibility (EMC) is designed into the 
technical or operational systems based upon understanding2 (B.Bateman, S.W. Hatton 2006), 
(Hughes,D , Saeed A, 2009). The idea that TBTC command for service braking distance 
function can be given lower safety integrity level SIL 2 than the TBTC command for 
emergency braking distance SIL 4 can be seen in the paper by S.D.Turner and a safety case 
has been prepared and accepted on that basis (S. Turner 2011). The way SIL targets are 
assigned to the command functions appear to be correct at first sight. However, a bit of 
thinking would reveal that if the output command for service brake function has failed then 
it is clear from the logic of IEC 61508 to note that distance computation or information 
available on train location is in error at the input stage of processing or algorithms for speed 
and location determination are in error. Over time, the distance to a danger point from a 
reference point on the physical track space at which the following train must necessarily 
stop does not always grow in size. Common cause failure analysis (CCFA) is a must as 
single point failure (SPF) destroys independent redundant designs is noted fact in the safety 
literature (Clifton 2005), (The UK Health and Safety Executive 2003) . In line with author’s 
argument, a paper by Tim Kelly calls for a cautionary approach when preparing safety cases 
(Kelly 2008).  EMC must be designed into system is argued by Armstrong (Armstrong 2006). 
Interpretation is necessary when safety cases are prepared strictly in accordance with the 
CENELEC norms is noted by an independent safety assessor (Skogstad 1999). Author 
asserts that analysis of safety property in the form of safety cases cannot be like banker’s 
note which is issued by a firm which has nothing other than paper obligations to back it 
with. The notion of comparing safety case analysis with a banker’s note is gained reading 
from of text on the page 123 of Arthur Schopenhauer’s book (Schopenhaeur 1820/2006).  
2.3 Emergent property, perceptions, causation, system safety viewpoint  
The SIRI Framework adopts the cognitive science tradition of Rasmussen’s skill-rule-
knowledge framework and argues that measures to eliminate affordances for errors and 
harm are feasible in the railway context. The term affordance refers to the basic properties of 
                                                 
2 Understanding is a technical term denoting a faculty which means causation from David Hume’s 
perspective and this definition is accepted in this chapter. The Bayesian Belief Network, if used, should 
model engineering and managerial factors as well to meet the requirements of the risk management 
model advanced by Jens Rasmussen (Rassmussen 1997). 
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objects that shape the way people react to them. An artefact that is well designed should, 
through appropriate use of invariant features, make obvious what is for and how it should 
be used. Author is of the view point that the signalling systems and railway infrastructure in 
the context of rail-road interfaces or man-machine interfaces should be designed for errors 
assuming that active human errors do occur and eliminate error inducing situations from 
operations (J. Reason 1990), (S. Appicharla 2010). From a human factor perspective, a 24 
element model made up of 5 elements of perceptive organ system, 5 elements of sensory 
motor organ system, 4 elements of cognitive system with 5 elements of vital systems of 
respiration etc is used to represent the human element in the context of an operational 
environment.  This is a universal model which is supported in the domain of systems 
engineering, philosophy, behavioral science as well found in ancient Sanskrit texts like 
Kausitaki Upanishad III  (Valerie 2003).   
The SIRI Framework through the application of HAZOP/EBTA/ECFA/MORT studies is able 
to focus attention of the analyst on the where the cognitive mis-match between the task and 
the person is occurring or could occur by taking into account the organisational and inter-
organisations perspectives and their impact on it. The concept of affordance of harm directs 
attention to the areas where the lack of awareness is creating safety problems. Affordance in 
Gibson’s ecological approach is the direct perception –action mode of cognitive control which 
is depending upon a human being actively engaging in a goal directed activity in contrast to a 
human passively making judgments about  a given environmental situation as in the case of 
knowledge based sematic  interpretations(e.g. of a work of art). Jens Rasmussen cited two 
comments from Gibson (1988) as being relevant-‘’affordance links perception to action’’ and 
‘’learning about affordances entails explanatory activities’’ (Rasmussen, Pejtersen, & 
Goodstein, 1994). This is demonstrated through a simple example.  
Engineers experienced in the area of design of power distribution systems can grasp the 
concept of affordance for harm by studying the case of electrocution of several farmers 
when working on agricultural watering systems.  This case study by Casey (1993) was cited 
by Jens Rasmussen (Rasmussen, Pejtersen, & Goodstein, 1994). When moving the system 
from one location to another, apparently some workers occasionally raised the 38-ft.  long 
thin-walled pipes to a vertical position and touched the high voltage lines.  No one expected 
farmers to raise the long pipes to a vertical position for transporting them to the next field. 
Only after analysts actually visiting the location and interviewing people did it become clear 
that farmers usually raised the pipes to a vertical position to release rabbits hiding in the 
pipes and lethal consequences resulted when done below the high voltage lines. Thus, it is 
argued in the case study that it demonstrates the limit of empirical safety control and the 
expresses the need for shorter pipe lines as defence against electrocution under high voltage 
lines. The idea of teaching about human error categories was refuted as a barrier 
(Rasmussen, Pejtersen, & Goodstein, 1994). 
From the perspective of Energy Trace and Barrier Analysis( EBTA), the transfer of energy 
across the air-gap was, in the case of agriculture water system, triggered by reduction in the 
distance between the charged conductor and pipe which raised the potential difference 
above the natural dielectric strength of air acting as an insulator (barrier). The design failure 
in the situation was not to provide earth-wire grid beneath the overhead conductors to safe 
guard against the charged conductors falling to the ground or objects lifted up to them. The 
accident situation would manifest in the SIRI Framework when the designer’s emergent 
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property of Sustain_ the Dielectric Strength would be tested against possible variations 
during the HAZOP study. The application of guide word-No or Less would reveal the 
potential accident to reveal the farmer’s lack of perception of electrocution hazard (system 
hazard) and the failing barrier of safe distance (height) above ground. 
The dynamic interfaces between the system hazard, barrier and potential accident form the 
essence of the SIRI Framework. The loss of protection to the farmer together with dis-
functional interaction between S branch (technical system) and M branch (risk management 
factors) of the MORT would be revealed at the ECF/EBTA/MORT stage of analysis. The 
design engineer’s knowledge of clearance and creepage requirements for protecting against 
earth potential rise for touch, step and transferred voltages for various working conditions 
and states of environment would be tested during the HAZOP and EBTA studies. 
Inspection of author’s log book from initial days of work experience reveals that awareness 
of such conditions is essential competence on the part of the electrical power engineer and is 
still a valid idea as evidenced by entry on the public data base (Wikipedia 2011). This 
pattern of reasoning leads to ‘’how’’ question implicating conjunction of technical failures in 
the planning stage and local influences at the sharp end of operations. The ’why’ question 
implicating the engineering and management factors would be revealed from the use of 
question set  in the M branch of MORT studies. 
The IEC 15288 noted in the Annex D (informative section) the essential concept which the 
International Standard is based upon (ISO/IEC 2002). It noted that humans contribute to 
performance and characteristics of many systems for numerous reasons, e.g. their special 
skills, the need for flexibility, for legal reasons.  Whether they are users or operators, 
humans are highly complex, with behavior that is difficult to predict, and they need 
protection from harm. Author notes that the rational actor model assumed by behavioral 
school of economics is refuted implicitly in the Annex D of the IEC 15228 Standard.  Why? 
Because the empirical theory of human capital propounded by Gary S.Baker, assumes that 
investments into human capital usually are rational responses to a calculus of expected costs 
and benefits (Baker, 1964). Case study in the paper would show that this assumption is not 
true in the case of the UK railway signalling industry and the concept of ‘bounded 
rationality’ developed by Herbert A. Simon and acknowledged by James Reason persists (J. 
Reason 1990). 
The foregoing notions require system life cycle process to address human element factors in 
the area of human factors engineering, system safety, health hazard assessment, man power, 
personnel and training. These issues are addressed by particular activities and iteration in the 
life cycle, and are described in more detail in ISO 13407 and ISO/TR 18529 (ISO/IEC 2002). 
The concept of emergent property is important to be grasped in the context of systems 
thinking. An emergent property is a property which a collection or complex system has, but 
which the individual members do not have. Three examples are given to illustrate the 
concept. First, ammonia is a gas and so, is hydrogen chloride. When both gases are mixed, 
the result is a solid. The property is not possessed by either of the reactant.  Second, carbon, 
hydrogen and oxygen are tasteless but the particular compound, sugar’, has characteristic 
taste possessed by none of them. Third, The twenty ( or so) amino-acids in a bacterium have 
none of them possess the property of being ‘self-producing’, yet the whole with some other 
substances has this property (Ashby W. , 1956/1999). 
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Table 1. The SIMILAR Process mapped onto the SIRI Framework.  
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It is noted by author that concept of ‘emergent properties’ is not easily understood in the 
UK railway signalling domain. Author found a paper by E.Goddard which considered the 
subject of emergent properties in a very brief manner in the context of mass transit 
systems. But E. Goddard did not go far enough to include the concept of affordance of 
harm or system safety as an essential property of the railway system (Goddard, E 1998). 
Based on the concept of emergent properties, author rejects the J.S.Mill explanation 
perspective that it is possible to reason the property of the whole from the properties of 
parts.  
This view of J.S.Mill is countered by Chris Johnson in the discussions on the theme of 
complexity following the workshop held on Complexity in Design and Engineering during 
March 2005 (C. Johnson 2006). Author has noted that the contents of the document by Chris 
Johnson were not peer reviewed. However, latest research from the behavioral science 
domain indicates that 90% population of the human subjects tested by researchers did not 
confirm to the expectations of the ethical theory of utilitarianism promoted by J.S.Mill and 
Bentham. The goal of this ethical theory is encapsulated in Bentham’s aphorism that “the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation. The 
results published in Cognition were cited in the science and technology section of the 
Economist (The Economist 24 September 2011)”. Author’s assertion is that the idea of 
utilitarianism and associated ALARP judgments without taking into account the concept of 
unreasonable risk is verified by this research which generated the evidence that the 
antisocial personality traits predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas. The principle of 
correspondence has been used to draw similarities between control group and non-control 
group of human subjects in the laboratory conditions and outside of it. On comparison of 
ideas between Mill’s theory of causation and the Aristotelian theory of causation, it appears 
that Aristotelian theory is more logical (M.Copi and Cohen 1998).   
A key insight from the systems theory is that different individuals and organisations within 
a problem domain will have significantly different perspectives based on different histories, 
cultures, and goals. These different perspectives need to be integrated and accommodated if 
effective action is to be taken by all the relevant agents (Chapman 2004). But hope of 
acquiring true information from all the agencies to learn about the local as well as global 
interactions, from a top-down perspective is remote, and therefore, a bottom-up approach 
with no accident is acceptable policy is adopted to reflect upon the disturbing causes leading 
to system hazard and efficient barriers to eliminate them from operations. The idea of 
bottom-up approach in safety literature has been thought of by John Adams as well (S. 
Appicharla 2006), (Adams 2009). However, in contrast to John Adams approach, author 
does not recommend a safety action to be legislated as an effective procedure in the absence 
of efforts to detect policy and regulatory oversights and omissions that are occurring and 
impacting the standards in an adverse way (S. Appicharla 2010).  
Literature in the decision making domain often calls upon readers to imagine typical 
scenarios to draw their attention to the subject matter. These may involve an imaginary 
scenario of tough decision making on the part of an old and poor clerk to replace an old 
worn out coat and trigger an action to start saving for a new coat. Under the critical 
judgment of a young tailor, old and poor clerk needs to depart from a previous approach of 
incrementally repairing the patches of the worn-out coat. This school of thought may lay 
emphasis on the concept of psychological stress upon decision making in conflict situations 
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(L.Janis and Mann 1977). Sociologist(s) may demand the reader to consider the plight of a 
person who misses a crucial interview due to a coincidence of foreseeable but imaginary 
events or circumstances (Perrow 1984). Other researchers in business decision analysis 
would like to focus attention away from black swan events which are impossible to predict. 
Instead, they offer advice on risk management and recommend try to reduce the impacts of 
the threats we don’t understand (Taleb, Goldstein and W.Spitznel 2009).Some authors, 
would like the readers to consider the fact that human information processing might be 
subject to various kinds of biases due to use of thumb rules ( heuristics) and due to things 
like representativeness, anchoring, and availability effects (Tversky and Daniel 1974).The 
process of multiple valued decisions requiring trade off approach developed by Benjamin 
Franklin of assessing pros and cons of any given situation as he called it as moral or 
prudential algebra is another perspective on the decision problem. This method is cited by 
(L.Janis and Mann 1977).All of these articles may direct the attention towards a process 
called humble decision making. Successful decision making is all about avoiding decisions 
with no sense of overarching purposes reckons another researcher in decision making 
(Etzioni 1989).  In the medical health sector, Gerd Gigerenzer and J.A.Muir Gray argue that 
inability to make informed decisions by the doctors and patients using the laws of 
conditional probability wastes lot of public money. They urge that better use of condition 
probabilities and statistics would help the matters in the case of delivering patient care in a 
more economical way (Gray 2011). Charles Handy noted in the chapter on the ‘working of 
groups ‘that it has been shown in experimental studies that groups who attack a problem in 
a systematic manner perform better than groups who ‘muddle through’ or ‘evolve’. He 
suggests that the decision making procedure is also of great importance (Handy C., 1999). 
The same suggestion is made by Derby and Keeney that there is no single solution to the 
how safe is safe enough problem and social, political and ethical aspects of the problem 
must be addressed by the analysis explicitly (L.Derby and Keeny 1981). In the wake of 
Japanese earthquake disaster, few observers like Ekekwe call for better risk communication 
(Ekekwe 2011). 
As detecting subtle influences on decision making which cause behavior (rational or 
irrational) is an elusive phenomenon, the decision principle embedded in the SIRI 
Framework is the inherent safe design principle for the whole system. Thus, the system is 
biased towards no accident policy. Author notes that biases can be seen even in the case of 
founding father of modern economics, Adam Smith and other economists.  
Adam Smith writing in Wealth of Nations in the chapter IV on the origin and use of money 
stated that once division of labour being established, every man lives by exchanging, or 
becomes in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is called a 
commercial society.  
Further, after elaborating that barter trade must have been in place before the origin and use 
of money, he notes that in a village in Scotland during his time, it was not uncommon for a 
workman to carry nails instead of money to the baker's shop or the ale house. Adam Smith, 
it is reasoned by author, thought it is odd on the part of nailer to do that. This is reasoning is 
validated by commentary of a later editor of the Wealth of Nations in 1805. The 
commentator gave explanation of this fact in this manner: Factors furnish the nailers with 
materials, and during the time they are working give them credit for bread, cheese, and 
chandlery goods which they pay for in nails when the iron is worked up. The fact that nails 
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are metals is forgotten in the text the following paragraph. At another place, Adam Smith 
remarked in the chapter on real and nominal price that at the same time and place, money is 
the exact measure of the real exchangeable value of all commodities (Smith 1776/1937). 
Author finds price system to be invalid and untrue in the case of ordinary commodity like 
jam. On a comparative basis, a brand can be cheaper on the supermarket shelves even after 
being better on account of energy and fat content. The difference in price cannot be 
attributed to time it takes to make them as David Ricardo (1772-1823), asserted in labour 
theory of value. Another instance of an assumption made by economist(s), which author 
finds is invalid and not true is on the need for a government.  
Max Lernet, editor of 1937 edition wrote that Adam Smith assumed that there is ‘divine 
hand’ which guides each man in pursuing his own gain to contribute to social welfare and 
therefore, government is superfluous except to preserve order and perform routine 
functions. Author contends that this assumption is negated by the David Hume’s picture of 
a man not as a religious creature, nor as a machine, but as a creature dominated by 
sentiment, passion and appetite (Hume 1739/1984).  E.L.Woodward in his History of 
England wrote about new types of business-men arose who were’ without scruple and 
without pity’-free, but lacking   in any sense of obligation to their fellow men (Brown 1958).  
This mode of thought of sense of self within a community agrees with the thought of 
devotionalism or Bhakti Yoga expressed in texts like the Bhagavad Gita( BG) –with its 
emphasis on ‘service’, ‘grace’, ‘humility’, and ‘love’. This devotion is often compared to the 
anvil in a black smith’s shop in the Vedanta literature. In spite of repeated blows the anvil 
remains unshaken is learnt from the verse 10.7 of the BG (Nikhilananda 1944) . This thought 
appears to contradict the Vedic saying of prey-predator logic of eater is eaten away is noted 
by another Sanskrit Scholar, Wendy Dongier (Manu unknown/1951). The point of these 
discussions is that for each and every thesis, it is not difficult to find a contradiction in the 
form of anti-thesis which were called Antimonies by Immanuel Kant. Both antimonies 
which can be validly proven and since, each makes a claim that is beyond the grasp of 
spatiotemporal, neither can be confirmed or denied by experience (McCormick 2005). The 
way to resolve Antimonies is to grasp the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The Principle of 
Sufficient Reason is expressed generally by the idea that our knowing consciousness, which 
manifests itself as outer and inner sensibility (or receptivity) and as understanding and 
reason, subdivides itself into Subject and Object and contains nothing else is accepted in this 
chapter. To be the Object for the Subject and to be our representation are the same thing. All 
our representations which may be determined apriori and on account of which nothing 
existing separately and independently, nothing simple or detached can become an Object for 
us. This concept is due to Arthur Schopenhauer (Schopenhaeur 1820/2006).  
Unless, we represent an idea to ourselves we cannot compute. A cognitive animal, which 
carries in it a model or image of the environment, is a sort of animal which can form ideas 
about environment and process information. In other words, cognition is a computation on 
a representation. Let us consider the issue of external world which contains many diverse 
features, and objects which cannot occupy the tiny size of human brain. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that we store image copies of these objects or subjects which we derive 
out of experience (S. K. Appicharla 2010). From the forgoing, it is argued that reasoning 
from an economic point of view is fallible in some sense and does not provide a coherent, 
valid, logical and consistent explanation. On the contrary, the spiritual perspective as 
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expressed in the Vedanta texts is more rationale and valid in the modern context as well. 
This viewpoint finds supported by Arthur Schopenhauer (Schopenhaeur 1820/2006). 
Author notes that Adam Smith wanted to attack the feudal and mercantilist institutions of 
his age. Author learns from the BG Verse 5.18 that wisdom lies in seeing the same in all –
wether it be a brahmin endowed with learning and humility, or a cow or elephant or a dog 
or an outcaste. This verse suggests to the author that subjective biases can enter into safety 
assessments due to economic or social evaluations and therefore, a sense of equality is 
necessary when dealing with the question of energy that is harmful.  
It is noted by the author that Hume’s perspective and Kantian perspective on causation is 
challenged by Schopenhauer (Schopenhaeur 1820/2006), (Wicks 2007). David Hume 
accepted that reasoning about cause-effect relations results in a sequence of events whereas 
Immanuel Kant reasoned that a sequence of events presupposes cause-effect relation. 
However, Arthur Schopenhauer argued that empirical reality is a complex of space and time 
in which objects (things which are represented) co-exist with the subject (the representer) in 
space. For example, when a substance catches fire, for instance, this state of ignition must 
have preceded by a state which is made up of conjunction of affinity to oxygen, of contact 
with oxygen, and of a given temperature. Ignition must necessarily follow upon this state 
and as it has just taken place that cannot always been there, but must on contrary, have only 
supervened. This supervening is called a change. Therefore, law of causality applies 
exclusively to changes.  
Arthur Schopenhauer argued an explanatory account of anything does involve reasoning by 
a human subject using the connection of four independent kind( or parallel) of objects of 
material things( law of causality) , abstract concepts( law of logic) , mathematical and 
geometrical( law of mathematics and space), and  psychological motives( law of intention).  
From author’s perspective, these connections form the basis of motivation in seeking 
explanation of multiple factors for hazard occurrence and present true explanation of 
accident phenomenon.  
The early railway companies seemed satisfied with a philosophy that a big steam engine at 
the front of a train could easily push a horse-drawn vehicle on a crossing out of its way 
(Hall.S & Mark, 2008). No decision was enforced on the railway companies to avoid or 
eliminate the danger.  It is a regrettable fact of phenomenal reality that Hume‘s perception 
of a man dominates the social psychological perceptive. If any examples of divinity are to be 
seen in the railway world then one can observe it in the personalities of Col.W. Yolland, 
Captain Laffan, Captain Sir H.W.Tyler and several others who were actively involved in 
promoting railway safety in the period between 1851-1871. These individuals promoted the 
concepts of interlocking the signals and points, blocking the route and braking as essential 
principles of railway safety. However, the concept of braking distance was taken for granted 
by them.   
An expert in the UK railway domain thinks differently from a lay person on the matters of 
risk is demonstrated by the RSSB Research report T517 (Risk Solutions 2006).  Author has 
found this observation to be valid even in the case of safety experts. Author inquired from 
his lecture audience on 21 September 2011 as to whether they saw one or two women in the 
Figure 3. Author was surprised to learn that at least two persons out of about 12-15 persons 
in the room did not re-cognize both woman figures in the picture. Author did not perform 
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any further examination to make both groups to communicate with each other to establish 
reasons for not seeing the double figures. The audience was made up of railway and road 
safety experts at the sixth IET International System Safety Conference held at Birmingham 
(S. Appicharla 2011).  
 
Fig. 3. The picture shows an old crone or a 19th century young girl, depending upon the 
perspective of person looking at the picture. 
As Charles Handy noted that the order of presentation of information is important in the 
case of perception. He noted that people who were first conditioned to see young girl first 
saw young girl but did not see the old woman and vice versa (Handy 1999). The idea which 
author wants advance from his foregoing observation is that it is a case of selective 
perception of objective evidence rather than a framing effect and this may bias the safety 
assessor or safety authorities as well. Why? Because all cases of human perception involve 
selective perception and therefore, it is necessary that perceptual illusions and cognitive 
errors are eliminated to grasp the reality of the hazard situation. Mirage is one example of 
perceptual illusion (S. K. Appicharla 2010). The point of the above figure perception is to 
make clear that consciousness is spatially multiple but in temporal terms it has unity which 
has been stated by Baroness Susan Greenfield (Graham Walker 2007). The argument 
advanced by Baroness Susan Greenfield is that there are two requirements for the 
consideration of morality from a scientific perspective. These are a sense of self and a sense 
of consequences of one’s action. In line with Roger Penrose’s thinking, Baroness Susan 
Greenfield argues that synthetic brains will never be conscious because they do not have, 
amongst other things, intuition or common sense. It is clear from the foregoing brief 
discussion that the R.L. Maguire’s assertion that everyone has same mental model of safety 
or accident investigation is not true (R.L.Maguire and Brain 2006). Author accepts Ashby’s 
assertion that every creature has same physical brain is both acceptable and true (W. Ashby 
1960). 
Unless, the idea of treating ‘a person as a machine’ is abandoned, the concept of taking the 
systems view of the self cannot take root in our consciousness. This idea is borrowed from 
Lynn M. Rasmussen (2004). Lynn M. Rasmussen states that the idea of the systems view of 
the self with its simple description of surrounding systems, purposes, functions, and 
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processes, shows us how we are all the same, that everyone is “like us.” It transcends belief 
systems that divide us, links our inner functions with universally held values and ideals, 
and gives us a clear means for increasing our own consciousness and the consciousness of 
people of the systems in which we live (M. Rassmussen 2004).  The UK railway industry 
body, RSSB, did conduct research into the topic of ethics in relation to safety is noted by 
author (Elliott 2003) (Wolff 2002). However, the research findings were not reflected upon 
by the industry.  
This pattern of thought aligns with concepts of systems thinking as they are represented in 
the systems engineering standard, IEC15288, Annex D (ISO/IEC 2002). However, author 
would like to raise a concern here that this idea of relative self does not by itself extend to 
Karl Marx’s worldwide view of dialectical materialism (Rupert Woodfin 2004).  
To overcome the limitations imposed due to cognitive economy, system thinking is 
deployed to consider the emergent property of system safety by becoming aware that two 
kinds of awareness are present in the process of empirical perception. According to the 
system of Vedanta philosophy which this chapter accepts is that any object which is 
conditioned by the law of cause and effect is not absolutely real; for every effect is a change 
brought about cause, and every effect is temporary. According to the system of Vedanta 
philosophy the unreal never is. The real never ceases to be. The only Reality is the Atman, 
Consciousness, which is unchanging Witness of changes in the relative world( Samsara). 
The Absolute Reality is not conditioned by causality as stated in the Bhagavad Gita verse 
2.16 (Nikhilananda 1944).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. A layered view of the UK non- ERTMS Railway Transportation Process  
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A schematic example of the multiplicity and complexity of perceivable systems –of –interest 
in the traditional UK railway operational situation and its context is given Figure 4. This 
schematic shows: 
a. importance of defined boundaries that encapsulate meaningful needs and practical 
solutions; 
b. layered perception of the system physical structure ; 
c. an entity or element at any level of the layers can be viewed as a system;  
d. a system comprises of a fully integrated, defined set of sub-ordinate systems,  
e. characteristics properties of a system boundary arise from the interactions between 
system elements; 
f. humans can be viewed as users external to a system ( e.g railway user) or as elements 
within that system ( e.g. train drivers or signallers) or as regulators or controllers of the 
system ( e.g ORR/DfT) or as  suppliers ( e.g. signalling or rolling stock suppliers )  
g. a system can be viewed in isolation as entity, i.e. as a product or as an ordered 
collection of functions capable of interacting with its surrounding environment, i.e a set 
of services 
h. rules and regulations in the form of standards constitute a system with explicit purpose 
of documented and agreed procedures governing the interactions (lateral and vertical) 
within and across railway organisations, which can be used to support the self- 
regulation of system safety by the duty holders directly.       
Terry Bahill and Steven Henderson (2005) discussed 23 famous failures and identified 
putative cause of those failures of system designs in terms of important system engineering 
categories of requirements development, requirements verification, requirements validation, 
system verification and validation where these activities were done correctly and 
incorrectly.  They discussed that the Tacoma Narrows Bridge disaster can be taken as 
relevant to the railway domain was a case of system validation error. Validating a system 
means building the right system: making sure that the system does what it is supposed to 
do in its intended environment. They did not advance any scheme or framework by which 
the safety failures could have been foreseen. They hoped that the model System 
Requirements Classification Model (SCRM) and its divisions would help to improve 
understanding and compliance in the five systems engineering tasks (Bahill and 
J.Henderson 2005).  Author learnt that 64% of the failures studies were B1category of 
unverified or invalidated systems with valid requirements but poor design realisation.  
Examples of this type of system design are the Tacoma Narrows Bridge disaster or war in 
Vietnam and Super Conducting Super Collider. 12% of the failures belonging to the B2 
category of system designs which fail to adhere to their designs or fail to satisfy stakeholder 
needs in the process. System designs of this type are Mars Climate Orbiter and Titanic. This 
research can be taken to support the idea of Groupthink bias as a crucial factor in the 76% of 
the cases studied. 
From a systems engineering perspective, in accordance with the IEEE 1471, it is assumed 
that each stakeholder would hold a perspective relative to the system behavior, its 
elements and/or attributes (W.Maier, Emery and Hillard 2004). In addition to traditional 
Three Viewpoints of Requirements, Structure and Allocation of the Hatley Pirbhai 
Method, the system and related concepts are defined in the Viewpoint Method as 
indicated in Table 2. 
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Viewpoint Name : Safety Analysis and Requirements. 
Stakeholders: HAZOP Chair, HAZOP study members, MORT/ECF/SRK Analyst(s),  
Concept/Functional  System Design Team, Operational  and MaintenaceTeam, Risk 
Management Team, Human Factors Engineering team, Rolling Stock engineers, 
Signalling engineers, Track Engineers, Operational and Maintenace Staff, Accident 
Investigators, Data team, Configuration team, Electrification Team, Hazard Analysis 
Team, Asset Engineer, Software Team, Safety Policy Team, Reliability Team 
Concerns: Potential or actual accidents, Root Causes, Hazards, Barriers, Targets, Controls 
Factors, Management System Factors, Energy Flows, Vulnerability, System elements, 
Interfaces, Behavior, Biases, Safety Risk, Data Analysis 
Modelling Language: Entity Relationship diagrams, SIRI Diagrams 
Study Methods: HAZOP/Managmenet and Oversight Risk Tree /Events Causal Factors 
Analysis/Engery Barrier Trace Analysis. 
Consistency and Completeness Analysis Methods: Documented series of consistency 
rules and compliance of the safety studies with the basic concepts defined in the 
standards and guidelines such as IEC 61508/IEC 61882/IEC 15288/UK HSE Guideline 
238/ BS EN 50126/IEEE-STD-1233. Some of the rules and process may seem redundant 
but it is necessary to assure that different persons check of the same rules inside and 
outside railway domain provide diverse means of checking the reports produced by the 
SIRI Framework. The underlying concept is to perceive the harm afforded by the system. 
(IEC 2001). 
Table 2. System Safety Analysis and Requirements Viewpoint  
3. SIRI case study: Herefordshire level crossing accident 
The analysis started with the recording of facts connected with the accident which is treated 
as the top event or loss event in the MORT diagram.  
3.1 RAIB report on herefordshire level crossing accident  
The UK rail accident investigation agency, Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB), 
published results of its findings into the Herefordshire level crossing accident in February 
2011. This accident occurred on 16 January 2010 when a passenger train collided against two 
cars at the Infrastructure Manager(IM) staff managed manually controlled barrier type of 
level crossing. A woman passenger in one of the cars died as a result of this collision at the 
hospital while the car driver was seriously injured (RAIB 2011). The occupants in the other 
car suffered no injuries. Fig. 5 shows a BBC photo of the accident scene at the time when the 
barriers were up and the red lamp was lit.  
The RAIB accident investigation process identifies, as a general procedure, a causal structure 
of an accident made up of immediate cause, causal and contributory factors, and underlying 
factors. This structure explains how a particular accident came into being. In this particular 
accident, the report identified several causal factors.  
The immediate cause of the accident was the signaller located in the adjacent signal box who 
raised the barriers when train IV75 was approaching the MCB type of crossing allowing the 
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cars to move in the path of approaching train 1V75. The causal and contributory factors that 
led to the accident identified were a) unrecovered human error in the operating situation 
caused by signaller being distracted by a call from a user of a User Worked Crossing (UWC) 
and engaged in monitoring the progress of another train ; b) working out the time available 
to allow sheep movement across UWC; c) mentally distracted to work out the rules by 
which UWC situation to be managed; and d) the lack of engineering safeguard such as 
approach locking to protect against signaller’s error.  
The possible underlying factor stated in the report was the absence of requirements to 
consider safety benefits of such a measure in the Group or company standards (industry 
requirements) or in the UK Government regulations.  
Finally, there were no cues available in the operating situation which could draw signaller’s 
attention to the fact that danger was imminent in the operating situation. A further reading 
of the report reveals information that RAIB found the lack of regular communication 
between the operational risk team and the signalling team within the Infrastructure 
Manager (IM) organisation, Network Rail. This communication failure compounded the 
problem of determining the true level of risk. Human error that could occur in the level 
crossing situation was not included in the risk calculations due to the lack of regular liaison. 
 
Fig. 5. A BBC photo of accident scene. Accessed on 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/hereford/worcs/8465412.stm 
3.2 SIRI event causal factors, energy barrier trace analysis and MORT analysis  
The actual pre-cursor events which were triggered the crash are shown in the hand sketch 
using the Event Causal Factor notation in Fig 7. Author has used hand sketches for the 
analysis of the accident situation in the tradition of soft systems engineering started by Peter 
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Checkland (Checkland 2000). This diagram can be created using Microsoft Visio as well. The 
oval shapes denote conditions (perceptions or abstract rules) connected to the events and 
one to many and many to one relationship are shown on the diagram. To facilitate ease of 
comprehension, conditions which extend over time are shown in dotted lines. The analysis 
begins with the situation which is normative pattern/ situation of functional sequences of 
events. User arriving first at the level crossing, the train later (bearing in mind relativity of 
time at play) and train departing first and user leaving the crossing, later. This forms the 
core operational layer of the Railway System which is regulated by the Standards Layer 
which is surrounded by Societal Layer (refer to Fig. 4).  
The emergent properties involved in the actions taken by various people involved in the 
accident situation which were directly connected in the perception –action mode in the 
sense of affordance are as follows: 
a. Car driver’s action of perceiving ( event UD/E/2) the lifting barrier afforded the 
information that it is safe to go across the crossing space after having waited for the 
barrier to lift( event UD/E/1). This is in line with the connection between perception 
and action mode advanced by Gibson.  
b. Train driver’s perception of the Stop signal ML 42 changing aspects (RU/E/2) afforded 
the information that it is not safe to go as train driver became aware that some 
obstruction is expected. The action of brake application is directly connected to the 
perception as argued by Gibson.   
c. Signaller’s perception of the lifting barrier and the train (IM/E/3) afforded the 
information that there was an error on his part which could not be recovered despite his 
best intentions. This is in line with the connection between perception and action mode 
advanced by Gibson.  
d. Despite the application of the service and emergency brake, the event in the RU domain 
(RU/E/3) occurred affording the information to analysts or observers that signalling 
distance beyond the Stop Signal ML 42 was less than adequate for the train to stop 
relative to the train speed.  This is an indirect inference which is not directly perceived 
by us (author + reader). This is based upon the expected engineering and cultural 
norms that a signal shall be provided with a sufficient braking distance in case of 
emergency conditions obtaining in the operations.  
Based upon the above four premises, it is reasoned that affordance of harm was due to 
failure to provide adequate braking distance at the Stop Signal ML42. By the method of 
counter factual reasoning, it can be deduced that three elements of information went 
missing in the System failure scenario case. User was not afforded information as to whether 
it is safe to cross or not? The signaller had no direct access to the information as whether the 
train passed the crossing space or not directly from the environment. The train driver had 
no direct access to information at a point in space from where the train could have been 
braked to safety. The RAIB report provides complete information with respect to the 
signaller’s error. 
The analysis of the operational scenario depicted in the ECF diagram requires from a 
behavioral science perspective application of the generic human factors framework of Jen 
Rasmussen Skill-Rules-Knowledge (SRK) or the MORT decision model of the accident 
process. Fig. 6 shows the MORT decision model which author used for making decisions.  
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Fig. 6. A decision model of the accident process inherent in the MORT method.  
The same model of the accident process can be used to represent danger at the design 
decision stage where decisions are taken to assume risk by calculation or by ignoring 
harmful safety outcomes where the end product of such decision making is that potential 
danger is embedded into the operational situation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. A hand drawn sketch showing the pre-cursor events and conditions leading to the 
Herefordshire Crossing Accident on 16th January 2010. This is based upon the 
Schopenhauer’s method of explanation discussed in section 2.1. 
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Based upon the perspective of energy barrier trace analysis (EBTA), author has listed 
barriers and controls for the purpose of evaluation of the alternatives which can protect the 
road user. These have been collected as part of the desk -top search of the ORR and other 
railway websites for the initiatives underway. These are shown in  
Table 3. An evaluation of these barriers is conducted using the MORT questionnaire and as 
per the flow chart for conducting the investigation in the MORT User Manual. This is freely 
available for downloading from the NRI website (Johnson.W.G 1974). The results of the 
MORT application are stated in the Table 4 as per the instructions in the literature available 
(Gunderson 2005).  
 
 
Harmful Energy Flow or 
harmful Agent, adverse 
environmental condition 
SB1 
Target  
Vulnerable person or thing 
 
SB2 
Barrier & Controls to separate 
Energy and Target 
 
SB3 
 
Kinetic hazard  
( train movement into the 
crossing space) when it is 
occupied  
Car drivers and passengers Full service braking distance  
Restriction on train speed 
Obstacle detection  
Lifting barriers 
Road traffic light signals 
Active audio-visual alarms 
Passive visual signs  
Approaching locking 
Interlocking system 
Railway Protective signal 
Bridges, underpass etc 
radio communication systems  to 
private user worked crossing 
users 
 
Table 3. Energy Barrier Trade Analysis  
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MORT 
Branch 
Description 
Problem statement/comments Evidence 
S/M Oversights and Omissions 
Specific 
Control 
Factors LTA  
SA1: A passenger killed in Herefordshire 
Level Crossing Accident when a train IV75 
struck two cars at Morten –on-Lugg near 
Hereford.  
 
The movement of the train 1V75 into the 
crossing space when the car is in the 
crossing space is regarded as not being 
functional part of the level crossing when 
considered as an Operational System.  
 
The judgement that a blame culture is 
prevailing the UK railway industry is 
deduced from the fact that full service 
braking distance is not provided at the Stop 
Signal ML42 to facilitate train braking to 
halt before entering the crossing space in 
hazardous situation. Such a requirement is 
not stated by the Accident investigator, the 
Regulator, the Infrastructure Manager, the 
Railway Undertaking and the Standards 
body which form the Social Layer.  
 
The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) is the 
independent safety and economic regulator 
for Britain's railways. 
Following is the extract from the Office of 
Rail Regulator Website (The Office of Rail 
Regulator 2008):  
 
The on-going safety of level crossings 
ultimately depends on you, the users 
recognising the hazard and obeying 
instructions.  
The UK’s level crossing safety record is 
among the best in the world. 
Over a third of all accidents involving a 
train are at a level crossing. 
95% of the train accident risk arises from 
incorrect use of crossings by road vehicle 
drivers, such as attempting to ‘beat the 
barriers’ or run red lights. 
Less than 5% of train accidents at level 
1. The RAIB Report Summary.  
(The RAIB 2011). 
 
2. The train driver applied full 
service braking is evidenced 
from the paragraph 80, 156 of 
the RAIB report.  
 
3. More than 8% of accident 
risk is within the industry 
control at level crossings is 
stated by the RAIB (paragraph 
167). This data contradicts the 
ORR information given in the 
adjacent column.  
 
3. The risk of an accident 
involving a train and vehicle 
does not fall into Assumed 
Risk Category under the 
MORT Questionnaire as risk to 
be properly assumed it has to 
meet the decision criteria of 
adequacy of cost-benefit 
analysis, uncertainty about risk 
themselves, tolerability of 
risks, adequacy of information 
and interpretation provided to 
the person making decision, 
and finally whether decision to 
assume risk was made by an 
appropriate person. This 
question set can be seen from 
page 46 of the NRI MORT User 
Manual.  
 
4. The signaller error is a skill-
based performance error. The 
road user error is a rule-based 
performance error.  
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MORT 
Branch 
Description 
Problem statement/comments Evidence 
crossing are as a result of a level crossing 
failure. 
Pedestrian fatalities and major injuries are 
most associated with footpath crossings 
and automatic half barriers (a type of level 
crossing). 
SA2: 
Stabilisation 
and 
Restoration 
LTA  
Not considered due to the nature of the 
MORT desk top study. It is assumed that 
these branch events were adequate.   
The RAIB Report Summary. 
 
SB3 Branch Events LTA: : This branch is judged as being less than adequate ( LTA) due to 
the following reasons 
 SD1 Technical Information Systems  LTA 
 
b1.Knowlegde LTA 
d1. Application of knowledge from codes 
and manuals  LTA 
d2. Was the list of experts( to contact for 
knowledge) adquate 
d3. Was any existing but unwritten 
knowledge about the work flow/ process 
known to the ‘’action’ ’person?  
d4. Was there research directed to the 
solution of known work flow/process 
problems and was this adequate? 
 
Action person is the individuals ( or 
individuals) undertaking the work 
task/process. 
 
The signalling engineering renewal works 
did not use approach locking to prevent the 
raising of barriers. 
 
 
Rule 119 of the Rule Book did not indicate 
how the Gate keeper of level crossing 
would satisfy himself that no train is near 
before opening the gates to the road traffic. 
 
The signalling engineering renewal works 
in 2009 did not provide sufficient braking 
The RAIB report detailing lack 
of approach locking in 
paragraphs 95,130 and 136. 
 
 
Page 15 of Level crossings 
(Hall.S and Mark 2008). 
 
The RAIB report paragraphs 
35, 80, and 89 citing the events 
of signal aspect change and 
application of full service 
braking. 
 
The RAIB report paragraph 15, 
35,48,79,95 and 133. Paragraph 
38 provides clear indication 
that ML42 and ML5 are 
protective signals in opposite 
directions. ML5 and ML42 
fitted with the TPWS indicate 
that TPWS were fitted (at least 
at this location) without paying 
attention to the fact the fitting 
TPWS toML43 does not 
provide any safety benefit.  
 The list of research projects 
conducted by RSSB can be 
accessed from their website 
freely at the following URL:  
www.intechopen.com
 
Reliability and Safety in Railway 
 
170 
MORT 
Branch 
Description 
Problem statement/comments Evidence 
distance at the stop signal ML42 as the 
RAIB report stated that the braking system 
on the train was functional, and the driver 
of the train IV75 applied full service 
braking when Stop Signal ML42 changed 
status.  
 
No SPAD risk is considered when the 
installation of the TPWS equipment at ML 
43 and ML5 signal in 2003 was considered. 
This clearly indicates that there was 
awareness among the project signalling 
engineers that ML42 did not have sufficient 
braking distance. Either this information 
was either not shared with higher 
management or management has accepted 
that fact that engineering or management 
error cannot be compensated.  
 
The industry body, RSSB, and the 
European body, UIC conduct huge amount 
of research.  None of the research had 
identified non-provision of sufficient 
braking distance as a risk factor at the MCB 
type of crossing.  
 
The SD1 branch is set to LTA based upon 
the foregoing problem set.   
 
http://www.rssb.co.uk/SiteCo
llectionDocuments/pdf/report
s/research/T907_guide_final.p
df 
 
The European research efforts 
can be accessed from the UIC 
Website freely at the following 
URLs:  
 
http://www.uic.org/com/arti
cle/european-commission-
workshop-
on?page=thickbox_enews 
 
http://www.iva.ing.tu-
bs.de/levelcrossing/selcat/ 
 
All of the above represent 
knowledge based performance 
errors.  
d5. Previous Investigation and Analysis 
LTA 
b4. Independent organisation and person 
review the work/process to identify high 
potential hazards LTA.  
 
The signalling engineering renewal works 
did not consider the operational scenario 
during the project planning stage in which 
the train might encounter the stop signal 
being replaced to danger after passing the 
distant signal for the crossing in the clear 
position. An identical accident took place 
on 22 September 1965 at Roundstone level 
 
1. Stanley Hall and Peter Van 
Der Mark give detail of the 
similar occurrence and note 
that this typical of several 
accidents of this type in pages 
33-4, (Hall.S and Mark 2008). 
 
2. The RAIB paragraphs 157 to 
167 detailing risk due to 
manual operations. The RAIB 
observation that AHB are safer 
in comparison to manually 
operated barrier crossings is 
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MORT 
Branch 
Description 
Problem statement/comments Evidence 
crossing near Angmering, on the Brighton 
to Portsmouth line 
 
Col Reed, who led the public inquiry into 
the Roundstone accident did not consider 
the psychological pressure felt by crossing 
keeper and falsely believed that automatic 
half barriers would provide safer 
alternative. He did not inquire whether the 
sufficient braking distance was available.  
In this occurrence, the signaller lifted the 
barrier under the distraction from once in 
20 year kind of an event, user (farmer) of 
the adjacent level crossing distracted the 
attention of the signaller. 
 
The RAIB notes 12 near miss incidents and 
37 incidents of user abuse.  
 
Author had reviewed the work of 
ABCL/AHB level crossings as a HAZOP 
Chair and made the results available in the 
public domain.  
contradicted by data given by 
Stanley Hall and Peter Van Der 
Mark on page 78 that between 
2000 and 2006 16 fatalities have 
occurred on the AHB level 
crossings and none have 
occurred on MCB type of 
crossings (Hall.S and Mark 
2008).  
 
3. The risk data provided by 
RSSB in the Annual 
Performance Report in the 
form of histogram shows that 
user worked crossings and 
Active ( automatic controlled 
crossings)   pose more risk than 
manually controlled barrier or 
gated crossings (RSSB 
2010/11).  
 
4.Past MORT study showed 
that group think bias has an 
adverse impact on the safety 
outcomes (S. Appicharla 2010). 
 
All of the above represent 
knowledge based performance 
errors. 
The signalling engineering renewal works 
interpreted the term ‘absolute’ in the 
Absolute Block System to mean that only 
one train in a section is permitted between 
signal boxes on the same line at the same 
time. This interpretation did not include 
crossing space as a part of the line or route 
where trains and vehicles and/or 
passengers can be on the line at the same 
time on the crossing space. 
 
The signalling engineering works did not 
provide overlap or safety margin according 
to the Absolute Block Regulation 3.4 of BR 
 
Chapter 13, pages 48-53 
discusses the Absolute Block 
System Rules and Regulation 
of the Modern Signalling 
Handbook (Hall 2010). 
 
All of the above represent 
knowledge based performance 
errors. 
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MORT 
Branch 
Description 
Problem statement/comments Evidence 
300062/2, 1992 
The civil engineering works did not 
provide bridges or underpass according to 
the section 13 of the Railway Regulation 
Act 1842. The 1842 Act also gave the Board 
of Trade powers in Section 13 to authorise 
companies to construct bridges in place of 
level crossings at their own expense, 
although it should be noted that it did not 
give the Board of Trade powers to compel 
them to do so.  
Page 7 of Level Crossings 
(Hall.S and Mark 2008). 
 
 
All of the above represent 
knowledge based performance 
errors. 
The civil engineering, signalling 
engineering works and operations 
departments of the erstwhile BR 
organisation did not find satisfactory 
solution to problems of reduction of 
manning costs at the gated crossings, 
reduction of delays to road traffic and to 
improve safety as they adopted unsafe 
automated half barrier crossings    
 
According to study published by Andrew 
Evans (2010), on automated crossings 
accidents rates are higher because the 
primary responsibility for the safe 
operation of automatic crossings rests with 
road users in observing the warnings 
indicating approaching train. But in this 
accident, loss of protection took place as the 
train did not come to stop before striking 
the cars. 
Chapter 7 of Level Crossings 
details the major reappraisal of 
level crossing policy (Hall.S 
and Mark 2008). 
 
   
The accident process theory 
developed by Stott and used 
by many accident investigators 
in the level crossing risk 
studies is rejected by author in 
his previous publication (S. 
Appicharla 2011). 
 
All of the above represent 
knowledge based performance 
errors. 
The civil engineering works, signalling 
engineering works and operating rules and 
regulations did not specify restrictions on 
train speed when the route contained the 
hazard of stop signal being placed to 
danger in the Absolute Block Signalling 
system. Active human error in the ABS was 
perceived for the first time in January 1885 
when a signalman gave ‘Train out of 
Section’ bell signal to the previous 
signalman before the train cleared out of 
section. 
 
Page 52, The North 
Staffordshire Railway Accident 
near Stroke on Kent, January 
1885 and The London, 
Chatham& Dover Railway 
Signalling Arrangements  
(Hall, Railway Detectives 
1990). 
 
All of the above represent 
knowledge based performance 
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MORT 
Branch 
Description 
Problem statement/comments Evidence 
errors. 
The signalling engineering works did not 
consider any hazard review of the UWCs 
type level crossings which have potential to 
distract the signaller from monitoring the 
progress of trains. This type of error which 
has occurred is similar in nature to signaller 
error that emerged in the context of track 
worker safety HAZOP workshops author 
has chaired in 2006. This HAZOP 
workshop demonstrated that signalling 
engineers possess false beliefs about the 
equipment performance and outcome of 
the degraded scenarios. The results of 
HAZOP study were published in 2010 by 
(S. Appicharla 2010).  
 
In the case of Herefordshire accident 
signaller’s error is located at the skill based 
level where the necessary condition for the 
occurrence of a slip of action is the presence 
of the ‘attentional capture’ associated with 
either distraction or preoccupation.  
The actions of road user, train driver and 
signaller in the SB2 branch are judged 
adequate as per the cognitive science 
tradition. All active human errors were 
triggered by external causes. 
Rule 119 of the Rule Book did 
not indicate how the Gate 
Keeper of level crossing would 
satisfy himself that no train is 
near before opening the gates 
to the road traffic. 
 
The common belief that as long 
as the rules were followed, 
safety would be maintained is 
also seen in the case of the 
Astra Train crash in 2000 
(Halvorsrud 2002). Author 
from the Norwegian Railway 
Inspectorate reported that the 
signalling engineers and 
technicians reacted with 
disbelief to the suggestion that 
re-engineering of the signalling 
system is necessary. Why? 
Because railway signalling 
systems are assumed to be fail 
safe and it just not fail 
unsafely.  
 
The defective historical rule 
119 and defect in the signalling 
layout and planning are likely 
to provoke similar reactions of 
dis-belief to the idea re-
engineering of the signalling 
system and operational rules is 
necessary as it can be seen 
from this study. 
 
  
M Branch Events: This branch is judged as being less than adequate (LTA) due to the 
following reasons. 
 Problem statement/comments  Evidence 
 From the perspective of organisational 
behaviour, management control is the 
process through which plans are 
1. As per the SIMILAR process 
discussed in the section 2.2. 
2. Barry A. Turner (1976) 
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MORT 
Branch 
Description 
Problem statement/comments Evidence 
implemented and objectives are achieved 
by setting standards, measuring 
performance, comparing with actual 
performance and then deciding necessary 
corrective action and feedback. However, it 
is important that standards should 
prioritise safety. Case studies of King’s 
Cross Underground fire published by 
Reason (1990) and discussions on automatic 
train protection system by Whittingham 
(2004) do not lay emphasis on why policies 
failures in safety matters continue to occur. 
 
No lessons have been learnt from Barry A. 
Turner study of the Hixon Accident.  
published his findings on the 
problem of failure of foresight. 
Refer to section 2.2.1. 
Policy  LTA The ORR guide on level crossings did not 
call upon the duty holder organisations ( 
RU/IM) to provide full service braking 
distance when the stop signal is replaced to 
danger in the MCB type protected crossings 
or barrier crossings with obstacle detection 
As the ORR guide did not ask for full 
service braking distance at the protective 
signal, this is considered as a causal factor. 
 
When signalling schemes with full service 
braking distance at level crossings or 
changes to line speed or constructing 
bridges or underpass etc when proposed 
(as a risk reduction measures) these 
proposals must meet the process 
requirements defined by ORR as below.  
 
As these measures are technically and 
practically feasible as per MORT 
terminology and therefore, they are not 
logged as Assumed Risks in the MORT 
study. Further, the concept of duty of care 
from engineering perspective demands 
safety must be designed into operations. 
 
The definition of Risk and Hazard which is 
accepted in the UK Case Law is noted by 
 
1.COMMISSION 
REGULATION (EC) No 
352/2009 
of 24 April 2009 
on the adoption of a common 
safety method on risk 
evaluation and assessment as 
referred to in  
Article 6(3)(a) of Directive 
2004/49/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
contradicts the UK HSE Case 
Law 5. The conflict of 
philosophy between European 
Union legislation for inter-
operability certification and 
United Kingdom case law, 
rules and regulations is noted 
by Andrew Rae and Mark 
Nicholson (Nicholson.M and 
Rae.A Septembe 2010).  
  
2. ORR, Railway Safety 
Publication 7, Guide for level 
crossing managers, designers 
and operators does not call for 
sufficient braking distance to 
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MORT 
Branch 
Description 
Problem statement/comments Evidence 
author and there is a unresolved problem 
between the UK Case Law definitions and 
EU legislations on inter-operability, Safety 
Directive (Appicharla S. , 2010). 
be provided in case stop 
signals are replace to danger 
after showing clear aspect.  
(The Office of Rail Regulator 
2011) 
 
SFAIRP  ‘so 
far as is 
reasonably 
practicable’ 
Policy 
The ORR internal policy guidance on safety 
related investment decisions did not expect 
the duty holder to perform cost benefit 
analysis when the risk reduction action is to 
be taken based upon the relevant good 
practice as a baseline. When the relevant 
good practice is not good enough it 
recommends rough CBA to be undertaken 
and along with a correction for ‘optimism 
bias’. This is to make adjustments for 
overconfidence in the project estimates to 
account for cost overruns in capital 
projects. Where risks are difficulty to 
quantify, the guidance documents suggests 
using qualitative techniques such as 
structured workshop assessments 
supported by expert judgement.  
 
The RSSB guidance on taking safe decisions 
uses reasonably practicable policy. The 
argument advanced is that predicting 
accident risk in inherently uncertain. Similar 
accidents may give rise to different fatalities: 
31 fatalities (Ladbroke Grove) or 7 fatalities 
(Southall) and therefore, low frequency high 
fatality accidents cannot be predicted. 
Quantitative risk assessment is considered to 
be useful as high frequency and low fatality 
incidents can be easily predicted as there is 
plenty of historical data. This argument is 
not in accordance with the best practice of 
safety management. When the information 
is uncertain, the precautionary principle 
should be invoked. The principle of inherent 
safe design of signalling or any other 
engineering works is perceived but not 
cognised.  
1. This document can be 
accessed here. 
http://www.rail-
reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/risk-
CBA_sdm_rev_guid.pdf.   
 
2. The scrutiny of account the 
engineering safety 
management process followed 
by the UK railway industry 
which is biased towards 
operational reliability by 
taking into the number of years 
of reliable operation. The 
Yellow book does not contain 
any process for performing 
system hazard causal factor 
analysis as identified in the 
informative clause, 4.4.2.12 of 
BS EN 50126 (CENELEC 1999). 
 
3. E.L.Woodward in his 
History of England wrote 
about new types of business-
men arose who were’ without 
scruple and without pity’-free, 
but lacking   in any sense of 
obligation to their fellow men 
(Brown 1958).  
 
4. R.B.Whittingham (2004) 
argued in the page 188 that 
there is a lack of will to make 
necessary investment into 
automatic train protection by 
the railway industry using 
arguments of high cost of ATP 
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MORT 
Branch 
Description 
Problem statement/comments Evidence 
It may be argued that the recent 
commitment by the railway industry to 
install ERTMS removes this concern. 
Author wishes to draw readers’ attention to 
the fact ERTMS technology cannot be 
considered as a barrier in the same sense as 
TPWS. This judgement is arrived at by 
reading the technical review of the ETP 
project by the UK HSE Research Report 
0067 (2003) where the reviewers have 
expressed concern that all potential 
accident scenarios have not been examined. 
 
Further, the recent incident which occurred 
at the level crossing at Llanbadarn, near 
Aberystwyth, Dyfed, on the ERTMS 
signalled railway between Aberystwyth 
and Machynlleth, on Sunday 19 June 2011 
has drawn author’s attention. This incident 
raises a concern that integration and 
commissioning of national signalling 
elements into the Inter-operable sub 
systems to form a coherent and consistent 
operational system may not have been 
preceded by any hazard and safety 
analysis. Selective attention to optimism 
bias without considering other biases 
which can operate in the decision making 
process is a policy error.  
 
Author has already published the results of 
past HAZOP and MORT studies which 
show that expert judgement is 
compromised by group think bias in 2010 
(Appicharla S. , 2010). The question of blind 
spot does not arise as information and 
cognition of that fact that signal ML42 did 
not give sufficient braking distance has 
been there since 2003. 
 
Thus, question set is marked LTA 
per fatality averted but the 
situation is exacerbated by a 
lack of consistent policy by 
successive governments 
(Whittingham 2004). Author 
accepts the definition of 
internal and external causes of 
human error defined by 
Whittingham (S. Appicharla, 
Analysis and modelling of the 
Herefordshire Accident using 
MORT Method 2011) 
 
5. Blame culture prevails in the 
parts of the UK railway 
industry is noted in  the 
following paper on  
Organisational Dynamics and 
Safety Culture in UK Train 
Operating Companies 
(Weyman 2006). 
 
6. The railway projects do not 
consider all accident scenarios 
and include safety concerns is 
seen from the following papers 
on the Train Protection - 
Technical review of the ERTMS 
Programme Team report, The 
UK HSE Reserach Report 067 
and performance of ERTMS 
system. 
(The NEL Consortium 2003), 
(D. Hicks 2004).  
 7. Risk in management 
systems is a cause for concern 
is concluded in the RSSB 
Research Project T169 (Ansper 
Consulting 2004). 
8. Error in policy is a 
knowledge based performance 
error.  
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MORT 
Branch 
Description 
Problem statement/comments Evidence 
MA2. 
Implementa
tion of 
Policy LTA 
ORR notes in its annual assessment, ‘’Safety 
- weaknesses in Network Rail's safety 
culture have been recognised including the 
exposure of flawed injury reporting. ORR is 
often frustrated by the slow pace of 
necessary safety improvements, and a 
number of enforcement notices followed 
failure to make timely progress’’. This 
admission by ORR (ORR/14/11) suggests 
failure in general to the lack of thinking 
about alternative counter measures for 
minimising the problems.  
 
The question of budgets LTA does not arise 
as Network Rail is a profit making 
enterprise with annual profit after tax of 
£313 million in the year 2010-11. This profit 
can fund replacement of public level 
crossings and implement communication 
systems for the private level crossings in 
the signal box area. A rough estimate of £1 
million per unit bridge cost is assumed. The 
case of private level crossings can be solved 
by a communication system which can 
activate and communicate train arrival 
message to this set of users. Argument 
from social cost benefit analysis does not 
arise as it is evident that there is no 
shortage of funds for investment and the 
risk falls into intolerable zone. Failure to set 
an example by ORR is reflected from the 
above admission. Thus, this question set is 
marked LTA.   
ORR Annual Assessment 
Report. All ORR documents 
can be freely accessed from 
their website directly.  
 
This represents knowledge 
based performance error. 
MA3. Risk 
Assessment 
and Control 
System LTA 
 
This branch is judged as being less than 
adequate due to the following reasons. 
 
 MB1 Hazard Analysis Process LTA 
 
The like for like replacement project in 2009 
did not recognise the need for hazard 
analysis to identify potential accident 
scenarios. The RSSB and Network rail risk 
RAIB Report paragraph 167. 
 
 
This represents knowledge 
based performance error. 
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MORT 
Branch 
Description 
Problem statement/comments Evidence 
assessment process did not include the task 
of hazard analysis. The RSSB Topic Report 
says that, ‘’level crossings are safe when 
used correctly. Over 90% of risk in the 
previous ten years has resulted from user 
misuse in the form of error or violation (the 
remainder being due to other causes, such 
as equipment failure, reduced visibility or 
railway operator error).   
 
The analysis of S branch suggests hazard 
causal factors such as less than adequate 
control of work process are not modelled in 
the accident risk equation and therefore, 
answers to this set of questions are set to 
LTA.  
 
  MA3.Standards LTA 
 
There are no requirements to consider 
alternatives to current work process controls 
(approach locking) suggested in the Railway 
Group Standards or NR Company 
Standards or in the ORR Government 
Regulations. This conclusion is based upon 
examination of the ORR Risk Profile Topic 
Strategy for Level Crossings, HMRI Safety 
Principles 4 and 23 and Railway Group 
Standard GI/RT7012. The RGS GI/RT 7012 
did not contain any requirement for the full 
service braking distance to be provided at 
the protective signal. It is noted that it sets a 
limit between 50m to 600 m for the stop 
signal’s location from the crossing space but 
it does not specify whether it applies when 
the stop signal replaced to danger for the 
crossings operated by IM staff. 
 
The ORR Guidance on level crossings did 
not call for full service braking distance to be 
provided in the case of barrier crossings 
operated by Infrastructure Manager Staff. 
The guidance does not consider the fact 
1.The Railway Group Standard 
GI/RT7012 
(RSSB 2010) 
2. ORR Risk Profile Topic 
Strategy for Level Crossings 
(Office of Rail Regulator 2008-
09 to 2009-10) and ORR 
Guidance on Level Crossings 
(Office of Rail Regulator Aug 
2011) 
 
A paper by X. Quayzi (2011) 
argued that bounded 
rationality biases our decision 
making and leads us to a false 
sense of safety when using best 
practices. We are naturally 
inclined to use best practices 
without taking a critical view 
of culture, regulatory systems 
not defined in the best 
practices. This approach could 
lead to an increase of the level 
of risk (Quayzi 2011). 
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MORT 
Branch 
Description 
Problem statement/comments Evidence 
when a train passes the protective signal at 
Stop it might lead to an accident scenario. 
However, provision of full braking distance 
in other type of crossings is defeated due 
combination of the driver error and road 
user error. To be useful, where protecting 
signal is provided, it is necessary to provide 
full service braking distance with TPWS 
protection.  
  Data Analysis LTA  
  
From the inspection of the data in Figure 8 
and Figure 9, modelled by Andrew Evans 
of Imperial College, London show that the 
trend of high frequency and low fatality 
events continues and reveals that risk is not 
ALARP. The statistical overall frequency of 
accidents is estimated to be 2.63 per year in 
2009 causing 3.71 fatalities per year. The 
product of two figures gives 9.73 accident 
fatalities per year. The corresponding 
figure for 1967-2007 was 10.321. This is 
unreasonable risk as per ALARP 
classification of risk and does not meet 
policy requirements for risk management 
from ALARP perspective as per the 
guidance clause 3.7 and 3.8 listed on the 
Guidance Note on the website (The UK 
Health and Safety 2003). 
 
It is vital to consider decision errors in 
statistical process control domain where it 
may lead to a situation where vital clue 
about the phenomena under observation 
may be missed and out of control process is 
continued in the operations.  
 
The RAIB report provides the evidence that 
risk analysis was LTA. The risk analysis did 
not cover information about human error in 
the operating situation. Further, that the risk 
analysis procedure used by IM internal 
procedure for risk assessment i.e. All Level 
1. RAIB Report paragraphs 55, 
and 147 to 155.  
2. Reading of the following 
paper reveals that possible 
wrong side failure of barriers 
was not foreseen. The idea of 
condition monitoring using the 
fault tree and FMEA 
techniques detected only one 
third of the failures and none 
of the detected failures were 
causal factors in this accident 
(Roberts, Márquez and Tobias 
2010). 
 
3.  The Infrastructure Risk 
Modelling (IRM) undertaken 
by Railtrack, predecessor of 
Network Rail in 1997 did 
consider the dangerous 
failures in the consequence 
analysis and this modelling 
showed that some branches of 
the event tree did not contain 
any safety barriers and 
directly led to accident 
scenario due to automatically 
failure of barriers in the case 
of CCTV/AHB level crossings. 
But the modellers and analysts 
of the event trees did not 
consider engineering and 
managerial errors as types in 
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Branch 
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Crossings Risk Management Model 
(ALCRM) did not generate any trigger for 
hazard analysis is evident from the RAIB 
Report. 
 
In 2009, a mean of about 5 per cent of fatal 
accidents were at railway controlled 
crossings, 52 per cent were at automatic 
crossings, and 43 per cent were at passive 
crossings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Fatalities in collisions between train 
and road vehicles collisions 1967-2009.  
Source: Andrew Evans (Evans 2010) 
the fault or event tree analysis 
and restricted themselves to 
operator or user error which 
appear as external causes to 
the engineers and managers 
involved in the decision 
making on the standards and 
facility designs.   
 
The IRM later developed into 
the Safety Risk Model (SRM) 
which was reviewed by the 
Health and Safety Laboratory 
(HSL) in 2002 and noted that 
root causes of human error 
are not modelled in the SRM. 
The report noted a concern 
that SRM fault tree modelling 
might not support a detailed 
assessment of root causes of 
some failures. The report did 
not express any concern that 
engineering and management 
errors are not considered in 
the pre-cursor model. 
(Human Factors Group, 
Health and Safety Laboratory 
2002). The above comments 
show that probabilistic risk 
assessment was less than 
adequate to show 
contribution made by human 
failures in engineering, 
management and organisation 
levels. The event tree analysis 
in the context of nuclear 
power is discussed by James 
Reason (J. Reason 1990). 
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Fig. 9. Fatalities in collisions between train 
and road vehicle in 2009. Source: (Evans 
2010). 
 
- 
b1Technical 
Information 
LTA 
-b2Defintion 
of ES& H 
goals  LTA 
-Trigger to 
Hazard 
Analysis 
LTA 
-Sensitivity 
LTA 
 
The flow chart used for the decision 
making in the IM organisation on the 
proposed changes did not draw any 
attention to the hazardous nature of the 
activity. The existing method of ALCRM is 
insensitive to changes in the real 
circumstances concerning pre and post-
accident risk modelling are facts read from 
the RAIB report (paragraphs 55,149,150). 
The need to perform hazard causal analysis 
along with risk analysis is stated in the IEC 
61508 at phase 3 before the allocation of 
requirements. This basic safety standard 
can be used for non-programmable 
technologies as well.   
 
A paper published by another railway 
administration regulated by the ORR gives 
an instance of this kind of conceptual error 
of not considering system hazard factor 
casual analysis. Conceptually, BS EN 50126 
describes the idea of hazard causal factors 
analysis in clause 4.4.2.12, Figure 7 of the 
standard, but this analysis is not 
mandatory for the regulatory or system 
development process.   
 
The UK Railway Safety Risk Model does 
not integrate the fault tree and event trees 
correctly as it is required for the proper 
estimation of the risk. The top event of the 
1. The concepts of system, 
system hazard, and 
probabilistic risk analysis are 
not understood in the UK 
railway industry. This 
acknowledgement is made in a 
paper presented by  
G.J.Bearfield and R, Short of 
RSSB and Atkins Rail in 
September 2011 (G.J.Bearfield; 
R.Short September 2011).  
 
2. The RAIB Report 
 Paragraphs 55,149,133 and 
150. 
 
3. Hazard Management with 
DOORS: Rail Infrastructure 
Projects (Hughes,D , Saeed A, 
2009).  Hazard management is 
taken to mean management of 
hazard log rather than 
concrete action to eliminate 
the unsafe situations. Metro 
railways undertake multi-
method of analysis is learnt 
from the published literature 
on Sāo Paulo Metro  
(Joao Batista Camargo Junior 
1999).  
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fault tree is used as an input to the event 
tree in the case of the Railway Safety Risk 
model. This conceptual error does not arise 
with other PRAs where there is correct 
integration. 
 
The Installation of the TPWS equipment at 
ML 43 and ML5 signal in 2003 clearly 
indicates that there was awareness among 
the project signalling engineers that ML42 
did not have sufficient braking distance. 
This information was either not shared 
with higher management and management 
failed to act or was suppressed locally.  
 
Lack of communication between the risk 
team and the signalling team is noted in the 
RAIB report.  
 
Thus, answers to risk data analysis, setting 
of EH& S goal setting, trigger to hazard 
analysis etc in this sub-section are set to 
LTA.  
4. The Infrastructure Risk 
Modelling carried out by 
Railtrack using the Cause 
Consequence Analysis method 
the scenario crossing open 
before train has passed is 
recognised as an accident 
scenario (automatic function) 
with no barriers in place to safe 
guard road user life in the case 
of manually controlled barrier 
crossing CCTV type (Ref 
Railtrack/S&S/IRM_CCA/18 
dated March 1998). This 
document can be searched on 
the web using the above 
reference.   
 
Safety 
Program 
Review LTA 
ORR guide did not call up for any safety 
program review in the guide. There is no 
evidence provided in the RAIB report 
which gives the assurance that a safety 
program review exists in the IM/RU 
organisations. British railway did not have 
any cohesive plan for safety management is 
gathered from David Maidment’s account 
(Maidment 2002). The details can be seen at 
this URL: 
http://www.davidmaidment.com/railway
s.htm.  
 
In hindsight the claim made by David 
Maidment is wrong as BR did not 
implement MORT method even after being 
aware of its existence. This fact Is cited in 
the literature (S. Appicharla 2011). 
Thus, MA3 branch events are set to LTA. 
There is no single, clearly 
defined assurance process and 
formal safety assessment in the 
railway industry is concluded 
in the RSSB research reports 
T219 (DNV Consulting 2004) 
and T220 (DNV Consulting 
2004). 
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Conclusion This paper verified the MORT thesis that 
the Herefordshire accident occurred 
because affordance of harm posed by MCB 
level crossing was not eliminated by  the 
signalling layout, less than adequate 
signalling rules, less than adequate  
operational rules due to oversights and 
omissions.  
 
 
The MORT study concluded and 
reconfirmed that safety critical decision 
making suffers from individual as well as 
group think bias. Internal decisions taken 
by the industry attribute human error to 
external causes and this attribution 
provides a latent pathway to erode the 
barriers as per the SCM.  
 
The safety interventions can be initiated if 
the two proposals of bridges replacing 
public level crossings, radio 
communication with the private crossing 
users (UWC and other private crossings) 
can be established to provide information 
on the arrival of trains at the crossing space. 
Obstacle detection without provision of 
stopping distance for the train is not design 
which complies with inherent safe design 
principle.  
1.The MORT and Swiss Cheese 
Model  
 
2. Latest experiment published 
in the in the journal of 
Experimental Social  
Psychology reveals that 
society looks upon the role of 
producer with respect and 
admiration and looks down 
the role of worker (The 
Economist 2011). Society 
rewards risk taking but 
punishes safety risk taking is 
the inference author draws 
from the demands for public 
inquiries after every major 
accident. If human agency 
causes accidents, then human 
agency can prevent them as 
well.  
 
 
The idea that latent errors that 
precede a major disaster in 
defended systems is analogue 
to resident pathogens  in the 
human body is refuted by this 
case study as there were no 
multiple defences in the design 
of the operational system. The 
notion that fallible decision 
making cannot be detected is 
not true is learnt from this case 
study. 
Table 4. MORT Table for the explanation of the Herefordshire Level Crossing Accident  
4. Problem Statement 
Problem Statement electronically created 13 December 2005 
How do we identify the Interfaces? 
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4.1 Background 
The standards strategy is centred around the filter process which takes existing measures 
and determines whether they are defining a duty holder interface. The assumption is that 
within our existing standards all the interfaces are sufficiently defined. 
Within CCS & ENE the feeling is that this assumption is not valid. Many duty holder 
interfaces are either not covered or at best implied. If the existing measures where the only 
source of material for the new standards the fear is that many gaps would be left. 
What is required is a means of identifying all the relevant interfaces with a high level of 
confidence that omissions do not exist. Modelling of the railway systems is proposed as the 
means of achieving this. Furthermore, modelling may offer additional benefits. Note that 
modelling may not be the only means of achieving the objectives. 
4.2 Solution objectives 
The primary objective is to identify all interfaces (at the product level) between duty holders 
for each part of the CCS & ENE railway disciplines. These must be sufficiently detailed to 
ensure that all known technology implementations are described. In some cases the various 
technologies will create different interfaces and therefore need separate means of 
identification, in some cases the known technology solutions will not require to be identified 
separately. 
Where the choice of technology creates different interfaces, it will be helpful (but not 
immediately essential) to represent a non-technology dependent system since this would 
appear to provide assistance for the future development of new solutions. 
As a secondary objective, it may be helpful if the solution could provide assistance with the 
safety justification needed. Achievement of this objective is not essential. 
4.3 Exclusions 
It is not anticipated that the wording or the measurement values of the final control measure 
will be generated by the solution.   
5. Conclusion  
This chapter advanced presented a framework for the conduct of independent accident 
analysis and system safety analysis and assessment by taking cognitive systems engineering 
perspective in response to a problem statement expressed in 2005. This takes into account 
organisational, technical, individual and regulatory factors. The application of the SIRI 
Framework to the case study of Herefordshire level crossing accident showed groupthink 
bias is active in UK railway industry. Why? Because material cause (less than adequate 
signalling rule regarding stop signal location), efficient cause (less than adequate 
operational rule 119) and formal cause (managerial policy of relying on numerical risks and 
their pre-cursors and subject expert information and decision based upon a false erroneous 
grasp of ALARP principle ) have been demonstrated in the case study presented in the 
chapter. Thus, it is necessary that re-engineering action on the current signalling system, 
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rule-making and procedures of decision making is taken to manage the rail-road interface 
safety. This is to tackle the problem of group think and individual bias which has negative 
impact upon safety outcomes.  
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